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Abstract—Electronic devices with power-constrained embed-
ded systems are used for a variety of IoT applications, such
as geo-monitoring, parking sensors and surveillance, which may
tolerate few errors and may not be constrained by a strict error
detection latency requirement. In this poster, we propose a novel
low power online error monitoring technique that produces an
alarm signal when systematic erroneous behaviour has occurred
over a pre-defined time interval. A monitoring architecture
monitors the signal probabilities of the logic cones concurrently
to its normal operation and compares them on-chip against the
signature of error-free behaviour. Results on a set of the EPFL’15
benchmarks show an average error coverage of 82.9%% of errors
induced by stuck-at faults, with an average area cost of 1.2%
and an error detection latency of [0.01, 3.3] milliseconds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intermittent faults at circuits manufactured using Very Deep
Sub-Micron (VDSM) technologies manifest as bursts of er-
rors that repeat periodically at the same places [1], causing
the circuit to exhibit systematic erroneous behaviour (SEB).
Devices in the field that exhibit SEB must be identified and
maintained. However, the maintenance of electronic devices
used in low-power IoT applications requires often physical
access which might be impractical and has to be planned
in advance. Thus, the maintainability of those devices can
be assisted by monitoring their behaviour in-the-field. As a
result, a low power solution for monitoring SEB online is
required. Many applications for low power embedded devices
such as geo-monitoring, parking sensors, or surveillance, may
tolerate some errors [2]. Such devices are not constrained by a
strict error detection latency requirement, thus detecting errors
immediately as they occur may not be required, as long as they
continue to offer their intended service. However, being able
to quantify the amount of erroneous behaviour exhibited by
each device, would be beneficial for maintainability purposes.
II. ANALYSIS OF ONLINE SIGNAL PROBABILITIES
Figure 1a presents the concept of online signal probabilities
(OSPs). The number of input patterns in a workload is referred
to as workload size, denoted by S. In error-free normal
operation, the OSPs at a given node may vary depending on
the workload. As the S increases, the variation of the OSP
decreases and it starts to converge. The value to which the
OSP converges is the mean signal probability, denoted by
Msp. The variation of the OSP during an error-free operation
is referred to as signature window (w), with Wmax and Wmin










































Fig. 1: (a) Concept of Online signal probabilities, (b) Online
signal probabilities of 1000 workloads for circuit t481
are dependent on the input signal probabilities. Systematic
erroneous behaviour (SEB) is defined as the event in which,
for a particular workload size S, systematic errors occur at
a high enough rate that the OSP of an output falls outside
the signature window w. SEB may occur in-the-field due
to intermittent faults that manifest periodically as multiple
bit-flips or exhibit a behaviour similar to permanent faults
under specific operating conditions [1]. When such a fault is
activated, it may generate enough errors that the OSP falls
outside the signature window bounds.
Example: The t481 circuit of the LGSynth’91 benchmarks
consists of a single logic cone of 388 gates with 16 inputs
and 1 output. The error-free (grey) and erroneous (red and
blue) online signal probabilities of 1000 different unbiased
workloads, each of them consisting of 10K input patterns, are
shown in Figure 1b. The mean online signal probability Msp
of the error-free case is 0.641. When the circuit exhibits SEB,
the OSP converge to different values than the error-free Msp.
Figure 2a shows that the OSP of an error-free workload ex-
ecution follows a normal distribution, which can be modelled.
Computing the mean value and the standard deviation σ of
the normal distribution, we can select appropriately the w to
avoid false alarms. For instance, approximately 99.7% of the
error-free OSP are within a signature window w=[Msp± 3σ],
95.5% are within a w=[Msp ± 2σ], and 68.3% are within a
w=[Msp ± σ]. Thus, the probability of having a false alarm
is a function of the selected window, which corresponds to
0.3%, 4.5% and 31.7% for the windows w=[Msp ± 3, 2, 1σ]
respectively. Figures 2b and 2c present the histograms of
OSP for faults and errors, respectively, after performing a
full single stuck-at (SSA) fault injection campaign. The SSA







































Fig. 2: (a) Error-free Normal Distribution, (b) OSP of stuck-at faults and (c) propagated errors for circuit t481 with w =Msp±3σ.
(d) Proposed monitoring architecture
SEB in-the-field [1]. The horizontal axis shows the OSP and
the vertical axis shows the number of injected faults that
exhibit the corresponding OSP. An unbiased workload of size
S = 5000 was used and the signature window was defined as
w=[Msp ± 3σ], with σ = 0.00534. The fault coverage (FC)
of 52.55% is calculated by counting all the SSA faults that
cause the OSP to fall outside the w. Not all faults present
during normal operation bypass the inherent logic masking of
a circuit [3]. When fault is masked, few errors are propagated
with a small effect in the OSPs. That FC indicates that 47.45%
of the SSA faults have a small impact on the OSP. The error
coverage (EC) is defined as the number of error propagated by
each injected fault and whose OSP falls outside the signature
window, divided by the total number of errors. The resulting
EC of 97.77% implies that most errors observed at the output
are associated to an OSP that deviates significantly from the
mean signal probability Msp
Monitoring architecture: The monitor design (Fig. 2d)
consists of a n-bit counter that increases on the rising edge of
the clock when the input D is asserted, counting the number of
logic 1’s. The n-bit comparators assert the SEB output if the
signal probability sp coming from the counter is outside the
Wmin and Wmax values when the inverted measure input
is deasserted. The measure input is deasserted when the S
counter in the controller has counted S clock cycles. This
signal also increases the Cone selector counter, whose output
CS selects which cone to monitor in a round-robin fashion.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
This technique was evaluated for errors induced by stuck-
at faults, as these faults produce a behaviour similar to long
duration intermittent faults [1]. Random workloads of various
sizes were applied during simulations. Single stuck-at injection
simulation of all possible faults sites is performed to calculate
the EC of errors induced by single stuck-at faults (ibSSA).
Table I presents the results after monitoring a few logic
cones of some of the EPFL’15 benchmarks. The third col-
umn shows the error detection latency (EDL) given by the
workload size S followed by the number of monitored cones
[1, 5, 10, 15]. The ibSSA EC of the selected cones and of the
whole circuit is shown next, followed by the area cost of the
monitoring architecture. Monitoring the logic cone that ex-
hibits the most errors using a signature window w =Msp±σ,
TABLE I:
ibSSA Error Coverage and Area Cost
Benchmark
Circuit Workload Monitored ibSSA EC (%) Area
Size Size S / Cones w = Msp ± σ Cost (%)
(Gates) EDL Whole Circuit Selected Cones
sin 5416 7000
1 4.77 70.78 2.30
5 26.80 71.51 2.98
10 43.82 71.44 3.82
15 56.44 70.53 4.67
log2 32060 10000
1 3.60 82.09 0.39
5 19.25 74.88 0.50
10 33.39 74.07 0.65
15 43.78 72.93 0.79
voter 13758 10000 1 95.91 0.91
we see an average ibSSA EC of 82.9%, with an average area
cost of 1.2%. An EDL estimation for these circuits can be
performed by synthesizing them with a standard 90nm cell
library using commercial tools. The resulting operating fre-
quency is in the range of [3MHz, 1.1GHz], which produces an
error detection latency in the range of [0.01, 3.3] milliseconds
when detecting SEB after 10000 clock cycles.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this poster, we presented a novel technique for monitor-
ing systematic erroneous behaviour online. We proposed the
analysis of the online signal probabilities at the outputs of a
circuit when the latter exhibits systematic erroneous behaviour
and a monitoring architecture for observing the online signal
probabilities at the outputs of the logic cones of a circuit.
We evaluated the proposed technique on a set of EPFL’15
benchmark circuits achieving an average error coverage of
82.9% of errors induced by stuck-at faults, with an average
area cost of 1.2% and an error detection latency in the range
of [0.01,3.3] milliseconds.
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